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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Because this case involves the appeal of an interlocutory Order entered by the Honorable 
L.A. Dever, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) and Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 5. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court commit reversible error in finding and ordering that the 
release entered into by Plaintiff Stephen L. Peterson, dated August 4, 1993, had the effect of 
releasing Defendants from any and all liability for which they may be vicariously liable for the 
actions or inactions of Thomas Stengel? 
II. Did the District Court commit reversible error in finding and ordering that 
Defendants are entitled to a credit in the amount of $350,000, the amount paid to Plaintiff by 
Nationwide Insurance, insurance carrier for Thomas Stengel, and by American States Insurance, 
Plaintiffs underinsured carrier and that the American States Insurance Company has no 
subrogation right against the defendant for amounts paid to Stephen Peterson in compliance with 
the UIM coverage? 
a. Standard of Review 
The standard of review for an appeal of an interlocutory order granting a motion for 
summary judgment is de novo with no deference to the decision of the District Court. "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because entitlement to 
summary judgment is a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of 
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the legal issues presented." Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.. 2000 UT 36,1(8, 1 P-3rd 
539. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative case law regarding the issue on appeal is: Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 
P.2d 107 (Utah 1992); Nelson v. Corp., Latter-Day Saints, 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997); Thornock 
v. Jensen, 950 P.2d 441 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997); Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995); 
Blackhurst v. Transamerica, 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). 
The determinative constitutional provision regarding the issue on appeal is: Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 24. 
The determinative statutory law regarding the issue on appeal is: Utah Code Ann. §§15-
4-1, 15-4-4, 15-4-5; Utah Code Ann. §78-27-42. The above statutes are set forth verbatim in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a lawsuit brought by Stephen L. Peterson for the personal injuries he 
sustained in an automobile accident on February 12, 1992. Stephen Peterson's vehicle was hit 
head on when Thomas Stengel fell asleep at the wheel and crossed the centerline on 900 East. 
On August 4, 1993, Stephen L. Peterson and his wife Gayle C. Peterson signed a release in favor 
of Thomas and Susan Stengel and his insurer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company* At the 
time the release was signed, David A. Goodwill, the then exclusive attorney of Mr. Peterson, did 
not have (and was not told about) any evidence, knowledge or record of the employment 
relationship between Thomas Stengel and Coca-Cola, Swire Pacific Holdings and the other 
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named Defendants (hereinafter "Coca-Cola") existing at the time of the accident. In the fall of 
1994, when Mr. Goodwill was finalizing the underinsured claim of Mr. Peterson with American 
States Insurance, Mr. Goodwill spoke with Thomas Stengel and learned for the first time that on 
the day of the accident, Mr. Stengel was employed by Coca-Cola and was driving from one store 
to another in the course and scope of his employment when he fell asleep, crossed the center line 
and one and one half lanes of southbound traffic, and hit Plaintiffs vehicle head on. In fact, Mr. 
Goodwill later learned, Mr. Stengel's supervisor at Coca-Cola, Ray Lamb, had been told about 
the accident a few hours after it had occurred. 
Before the accident, Stephen Peterson was a self-employed artist, and he also owned and 
managed rental properties along with his wife to supplement his income. The accident has 
caused brain injury and greatly affected Mr. Peterson's ability to continue working as an artist or 
as a property manager. Mr. Peterson suffered a closed head injury with a cerebral hemorrhage, 
resulting in confusion and memory and concentration problems. Mr. Peterson's ability to 
distinguish colors has also been affected, and this has severely limited his ability to paint. 
Because of Mr. Peterson's damage and mental ability, On December 8, 1997, Judge Homer 
Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, appointed Gayle C. Peterson as the 
Conservator of the estate of the protected person Stephen Peterson and full Guardian of the 
person of the Incapacitated Person Stephen Peterson. 
H. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
After Stephen Peterson found out that Thomas Stengel had been employed by the Coca-
Cola Defendants and was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time he caused 
the accident, Mr. Peterson sued Coca-Cola, Swire Pacific, and the other named Defendants for 
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the personal injuries he sustained in the accident caused by the Defendants employee, Thomas 
Stengel, one count being under a theory of vicarious liability/respondeat superior. The case has 
been assigned to a number of different judges over the years during the course of discovery. 
Finally the case was assigned to Third District Court Judge L.A. Dever. The Defendants filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based upon the release Plaintiff Stephen Peterson signed 
(releasing Thomas Stengel from liability). Because of Mr. Stengel's limited automobile liability 
coverage before Coca Cola and Swire Pacific Holdings revealed their responsibility. 
HI. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
On August 8, 2000, a hearing was held before Judge Dever on Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. In an Order dated August 28, 2000 granting Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Judge Dever found that: (1) the release had the effect of releasing the 
undisclosed Defendants from any and all liability for which they would otherwise be vicariously 
liable; (2) that there was no evidentiary or legal basis to require the reforming, voiding, or 
otherwise failing to enforce the release; and (3) that "if for some reason the release does not 
release the vicarious liability of the Defendants, then the Defendants are entitled to a credit of 
$350,000 (consisting of $50,000 paid to Plaintiff by Nationwide Insurance Co., the liability 
carrier for Thomas Stengel, and $300,000 paid to Plaintiff by American States Insurance Co., the 
underinsured motorist carrier for Stephen Peterson) against any judgment based on the 
defendant's vicarious liability for the acts of Thomas Stengel." 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On February 12, 1992, Thomas E. Stengel was driving northbound on 900 East, 
fell asleep and crossed the centerline. He collided head-on with Stephen L. Peterson, who was 
traveling southbound on 900 East. (Rec. pp. 225-271). 
2. At the time of the accident, Thomas E. Stengel was employed by Defendant Swire 
Pacific Holdings, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, dba, Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake, 
hereinafter referred to as Coca Cola. Thomas E. Stengel was a merchandiser and was acting 
within the scope of his employment. (Rec. pp. 225-271). 
3. Thomas Stengel's supervisor for Coca Cola was told about the accident "two or 
three hours after the accident." (See deposition of Ray Lamb at 13-14, Rec. pp. 277-314). 
4. Stephen L. Peterson was unconscious from the time he was hit head-on until he 
came into the hospital. (See deposition of Stephen L. Peterson at 153, Rec. pp. 277-314). 
5. On August 4, 1993, Stephen L. Peterson and his wife Gayle C. Peterson signed a 
release in favor or Thomas and Susan Stengel and Nationwide Mutual Company. (Rec. pp. 277-
314). Nationwide paid its policy limit of $50,000. 
6. American States Insurance recognized the extensive nature of Mr. Peterson's 
injuries and paid their underinsured motorist coverage policy limits of $300,000 on the 
understanding that Mr. Stengel only had $50,000 of insurance or back up coverage. 
7. In the fall of 1994, when finalizing settlement negotiations with American States 
Insurance, the underinsured motorist carrier of Stephen L. Peterson, counsel for Mr. Peterson, 
David A. Goodwill spoke with Thomas Stengel. He learned for the first time that in the day of 
the accident, Stengel was employed by Coca Cola and when he hit the Peterson vehicle head-on 
he was going from one of Coca-Cola's customer's stores to another store in the scope and course 
of his employment. (See affidavit of David A. Goodwill, Rec. pp. 277-314). 
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8. At the time the Release with Nationwide was signed, David A. Goodwill, the 
attorney for Stephen L. Peterson, did not have any knowledge or record of the employment 
relationship between Thomas Stengel and Coca Cola. (See affidavit of David A. Goodwill, Rec. 
pp. 277-314). 
9. Since the accident, Stephen Peterson has been unable to do simple arithmetic. If 
he wants to make out a check for a few dollars over the purchase amount, he can't figure out how 
much to write the check for. Mr. Peterson has been unable to continue his self-employment as a 
painter because of the serious injuries he suffered from the accident. (See deposition of Gayle 
Peterson at 82-83, Rec. pp. 277-314). 
10. On December 8, 1997, Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, appointed Gayle C. Peterson as conservator of 
the estate of the protected person Stephen L. Peterson. (See Acceptance of Appointment and 
Petition for Appointment of Guardian, Rec. pp. 277-314). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it granted Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Trial Court's Order was contrary to controlling precedent and 
the Trial Court misapplied the applicable statutes to the facts of the case to reach its findings in 
the Order dated August 28, 2000. The court also clearly misunderstood UIM law and the effects 
of UIM subrogation law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. COCA COLA IS AN UNREVEALED AND UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL WHO 
SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOILERPLATE 
LANGUAGE IN THE RELEASE 
In Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992) the Supreme Court observed: 
It is well established in the law that a principal is liable for the acts of his 
agent within the scope of the agent's authority, irrespective of whether the 
principal is disclosed or undisclosed. The fact that an agent acts in his own 
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name without disclosing his principal does not preclude liability on the part of 
the principal when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt 
with the agent 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency 320 (1986). This is true even though the 
third person dealing with the agent did not learn of the existence of the 
principal until after the bargain was completed. Holman-O.D. Baker Co. v. Pre-
Design, Inc., 104 N.H. 116, 118, 179 A2.d 454, 455 (1962). The Restatement 
(Second) of Agency 186 (cmt.c) (1957) states that for the purpose of proving that 
the agent was acting within his authority, parol evidence is admissible, even 
though the contract is in writing, (emphasis added). 
The evidence proves that Stengel was acting within the scope and course of his 
employment when he injured Plaintiff. When he obtained a release that his employer now claims 
released it from liability, Stengel was acting within the scope of his employment. Since Plaintiff 
did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the bargain was completed, the release 
cannot preclude liability on the part of the principal. Since defendants did not reveal their 
existence until after the release was signed, they should not be allowed to benefit from that 
concealment. The bargain, in this case, was the release, and Garland clearly establishes that in 
Utah an agent acting in his own name without disclosing the principal does not preclude liability 
on the part of the principal, even if the third person does not learn of the existence of the 
principal until after the bargain was completed. When applied to the present case, the law 
established in Garland clearly does not allow the Defendants to use the release to escape liability. 
Stengel was in the course and scope of his employment when he injured Plaintiff, and Defendant 
argue that when he signed the release, he also released the Defendants. (Defendants of which 
they knew nothing.) Under Garland, Stengel, acting as agent and not disclosing that he was in 
the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, could not preclude liability 
on the part of his principal, the Defendants. 
II. THE RELEASE OF A TORT-FEASOR IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION DOES NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY RELEASE THE TORT-FEASOR'S "MASTER" UNDER 
PRINCIPLES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY. 
In Nelson v. Corp., Latter-Day Saints. 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997) the court held: 
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This case requires us to decide whether the release of a tort-feasor in a 
negligence action automatically releases the tort-feasor's "master" under 
principles of vicarious liability. We hold that it does not...In Krukiewicz, we 
interpreted section 78-27-42 of the CNA: "A release by the injured person of one 
joint tort-feasor...does not discharge the other tort-feasors." Id. at 1350. We 
ultimately held that a vicariously liable employer was a "joint tort-feasor" under 
the statute, such that the release of the employee did not release the employer. Id. 
at 1351.1. We recognized that an employer's liability under respondeat superior 
"arises not as a result of any actual negligence by the employer," but because the 
employer reaps the benefits of the employee's acts and may more easily spread the 
costs of accidents. Id. at 1351. Therefore, "although the employer and employee 
are not [common law] tortfeasors, they are nonetheless each obligated for the 
same thing-total reparation of the damages to the victim." Id. (quoting Sampay v. 
Morton Salt Co., 395 S. 2d 326, 328 (La. 1981)). As a result, we held that 
because the master and the servant are equally liable, both are tort-feasors under 
the statute and the servant's release does not release the master. 
Nelson is a case where the plaintiff knew the identity of the master and therefore 
specifically reserved rights against it. The court applied §15-4-4 because the plaintiff had 
reserved rights against the employer. In §15-4-4 it provides that the release of one obligor does 
not discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing expressly reserves his rights. 
The court did not have to decide whether or not the Liability Reform Act, §78-27-42, 
applied. The Liability Reform Act provides that "A release given by a person seeking recovery 
to one or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
It defines "defendant" as "...a person...who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person 
seeking recovery." 
The court did not rule on whether or not the master was a defendant because liability is 
imputed to it by operation of law. It reserved that issue for another case. The court stated, 
"Notwithstanding the reliance of the parties in their briefs on competing interpretations of the 
LRA2, we conclude that this case may be resolved pursuant to the Joint Obligations Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 15-4-1 to 5." The court in Nelson observed in footnote 2: 
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2 Plaintiff argues that the Church's fault, for purposes of the LRA, is imputed 
from the acts of Crabtree. Thus, they contend that the Church is a "defendant" 
under the LRA. Because we find, however, that the Joint Obligations Act 
specifically addresses this issue, we need not determine the merits of plaintiffs 
interpretation. 
III. FOLLOWING THE LITERAL WORDING OF A STATUTE IS NOT REQUIRED 
WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DEFEAT LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND MAKE THE 
STATUTE ABSURD 
In Thornock v. Jensen, 950 P.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1997) the court observed: 
Treating the statute as inapplicable because the release given here was given to 
someone who does not qualify as a "defendant" under a narrow reading of the 
statute defeats the purpose of the statute, which is to retain the liability of 
tortfeasors who are not named in a release. To give effect to the statute, as 
clarified by our Supreme Court, the focus must remain on the tortfeasor seeking 
the protection of a release even though not specifically named in it, not on the 
fortuitous circumstance of whether the party named in the release is really claimed 
to be at fault. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs release of Lowell Jensen did not also release defendant. 
"We are cognizant of the fact that we are not following the literal wording of the 
statute, but such is not required when to do so would defeat legislative intent and 
make the statute absurd." Johnson v. Cudahv Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 135. 
Although Lowell Jensen is perhaps not a defendant under a literal reading of §78-
27-42, he must be regarded as one in order to avoid an absurd result and to bring 
this case within the intent of §78-27-42. Thus, the release naming Lowell Jensen 
did not also release defendant, who was not named. Accordingly, we reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand for 
such further proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
In our case Coca-Cola was not named in the release and was in fact an undisclosed 
principal. It would be absurd to apply §78-27-42 to reserve the liability of a tortfeasor who was 
not specifically named in the release even though known to the party giving the release, but to 
terminate the liability of a tortfeasor not known to the releasor and not specifically named in the 
release, because the unknown tortfeasor happens to be the employer of the party released. 
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In Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
the whether the release of one defendant released all defendants when the language "all other 
persons, firms, or corporations" was used in the release. This is the same language used in the 
release in this case and relied upon by the Defendants. The Supreme Court interpreted §78-27-42 
as being enacted to repeal §15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations Act. Id. at 11. "The statute was 
designed to retain the liability of tort-feasors and reverse the common law rule so that the release 
of one joint tort-feasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." Id at 11. The Supreme 
Court went on to hold: 
In light of this statutory purpose, the phrase "unless the release so provides" must 
be construed narrowly as requiring some degree of specificity. Holding otherwise 
would necessarily run contrary to the statute's purpose by allowing general release 
language which does not name or specifically identify a particular tort-feasor to 
discharge that tort-feasor. Such an approach would effectively perpetuate the 
common law by permitting boilerplate language in a release discharging one tort-
feasor to discharge all other tort-feasors in direct opposition to the very statute that 
was enacted to prevent this from occurring. 
Although Coca-Cola is perhaps not a defendant/tort-feasor under a literal reading of §78-
27-42 because it is only vicariously liable, it must be regarded as one in order to avoid an absurd 
result and to bring this case within the intent of §78-27-42. To do otherwise would allow an 
employer with vicarious liability to escape liability because the employment relationship between 
the tort-feasor/employee was unknown at the time the release was entered into. 
IV. ALL LAWS OF A GENERAL NATURE SHALL HAVE UNIFORM OPERATION. 
The Utah Constitution provides in Article I Section 24, Uniform Operation of Laws, as 
follows: All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) the court observed: 
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By making both the two and four-year limitations periods applicable to minors, 
§78-14-4(2) of the Malpractice Act not only treats minors injured by a health care 
provider categorically differently from minors injured by all other defendants...In 
conclusion, we hold §78-14-4(2) unconstitutional under Article I, section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution. As a result, §78-12-36 [the tolling provision relating to the 
period of minority] operates to toll both the two-year statute of limitations and the 
four-year statute of repose found in §78-14-4( 1) of the Malpractice Act. 
It would be a violation of the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, section 24, to treat parties injured by an undisclosed principal 
categorically different from parties injured by all other unknown tortfeasors not specifically 
named in the release under §78-27-42, which provides that "a release to one or more defendants 
does not release any other defendant unless the release so provides." 
Under §78-27-42 even without a reservation of rights, an employer/tortfeasor is not 
released. Under §15-4-4, without a reservation of rights an employer/tortfeasor is released, 
despite the fact that §78-27-42 was passed to retain the liability of tort-feasors and reverse the 
common law rule so that release of one joint tort-feasor does not automatically release all 
tortfearos. Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d (Utah 1995). 
The Court should hold §15-4-1 to §15-4-7 unconstitutional under Article I, section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution in so far as it would operate to require that the release of a tort-feasor in a 
negligence action automatically releases the tortfeasor's "master" under the principles of 
vicarious liability, where the plaintiff does not reserve his rights against the "master." Such an 
automatic release would be in violation of, and in direct opposition to, the purpose of §78-27-42 
which was to retain liability against tortfeasors that were not named in the release. It would also 
be in direct violation of §15-4-5 which provides that plaintiffs claim is reduced "only to the 
extent of the amounts paid by an co-obligor." 
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V. ONLY GENERAL GUARDIANS CAN COMPROMISE THE CLAIMS OF AN 
INCOMPETENT PERSON 
In Blackhurst v. Transamerica, 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985) the court observed: 
Only general guardians can compromise the claims of an incompetent person. We 
acknowledge this to be the general rule. See Hansen v. Gossett, Utah, 590 P.2d 
1258, 1260 (1979). However, the rule requiring guardians for incompetent 
persons is for their protection. 
On December 11, 1997 Peterson's wife was appointed general guardian of his person and 
estate based upon the following consequences of the accident that occurred on Febmary 12, 
1992. Some of the reasons for the appointment as set forth in the Petition for Appoinlment for 
Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated Person and for Appointment of Conservator are as 
follows: 
The person to be protected is 63 years of age and is incapacitated by reason of the 
following circumstances which include but are not limited to: 
Closed head injury with cerebral hemorrhage. U.Hosp 2/12/92 Dr. Carr. 
Left supero orbital rim fracture and nasal fracture. Dr. Peter Heinbecker, 5-20-93. 
Frontal lobe and temporal lobe injuries resulting in confusion, and memory and 
concentration problems. Thirty percent (30%) Permanent disability/impairment 
due to mental and behavioral disorders. Dr. Gregory L. Mayer 6/24/903. 
Difficulty comprehending what he reads and sometimes he simply cannot 
read and understand what he used to be able to read and understand, consistent 
with injury to the frontal and left temporal lobes of the brain. Dr. Peter 
Heinbecker 5/20/93. Permanent impairment/disability of 79% Dr. Peter 
Heinbecker 6/9/93. 
Since Stephen Peterson was incompetent he could not enter into a contract for himself. 
Since neither his wife nor anyone else was appointed guardian for Stephen Peterson before the 
August 4, 1993 release with the Stengals and their insurer, the release is void. 
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VI. THE RELEASE WITH STENGEL SHOULD BE REFORMED DUE TO THE 
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE PARTIES 
In Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d 9, (Utah 1995) the court observed in footnote number 2: 
2 Child additionally argues on appeal that even if the trial court was correct in 
concluding that the release discharged Newsom from liability, either the language 
of the release ought to be reformed due to the mutual mistake of the parties 
signing the release or, in the alternative, the release should be invalidated due to 
negligent misrepresentation by American States. However, because we dispose of 
this case on the basis of the language of the release as written, we do not address 
Child's other arguments on appeal. 
In Mabev v. Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984) the Court observed as to 
reformation of a written instrument as follows: 
If is the rule in this forum that the power to reform a written instrument by reason 
of mutual mistake exists under three alternative proofs: 
(1) that the instrument as made failed to conform to what both parties intended; or 
(2) that the claiming party was mistaken as to its actual content and the other 
party, knowing of this mistake, kept silent; or (3) that the claiming party was 
mistaken as to actual content because of fraudulent affirmative behavior. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Plaintiff believes that neither Stengel nor Peterson intended to release the Coca Cola 
Defendants in the release. Peterson did not know of the existence of the employer/employee 
relationship between Stengel and Coca-Cola. Stengel must not have known that the language 
"all other persons, firms and corporations" would also release his employer. Therefore, under the 
doctrine of mutual mistake the contract should be reformed to serve rights against Coca-Cola. 
Peterson knew the $50,000 in the Stengal release would not make him whole and he reserved 
rights against his underinsured motorist carrier. If he had known the existence of the 
employment relationship with Coca Cola he would have reserved rights against Coca-Cola as 
well. 
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If Stengal knew that the release language would also release his employer and kept silent 
about the employment relationship the contract should be also be reformed to include a 
reservation of rights against Coca-Cola. If there was fraudulent affirmative behavior on the part 
of Stengel acting in concert with Coca-Cola the release should be reformed to include a 
reservation of rights against Coca-Cola. There must be the intent to enter a release to have a 
release. 
VII. WHERE NO RESERVATION OF RIGHTS IS INCLUDED IN THE RELEASE, IT 
RELEASES CO-OBLIGORS ONLY TO THE EXTENT PROVIDED IN 15-4-5, WHICH 
IS ESSENTIALLY TO REDUCE ANY JUDGMENT BY THE AMOUNT PAID BY THE 
RELEASED CO-OBLIGORS AND AN UNDERINSURED CARRIER IS NOT A CO-
OBLIGOR 
Section 15-4-5 provides as follows: 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not then such 
knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be 
satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: (a) the amount of the 
fractional share of the obligor released or discharged, or (b) the amount that such 
obligor was bound by his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay. 
In Nelson v. Corp., supra, the court observed as to a co-obligor against whom there was 
no reservation of rights as follows: 
Section 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations Act, similar to §78-27-42 of both the CNA 
and the LRA, provides that the release of one obligor does not discharge co-
obligors against whom the obligee in writing expressly reserves his rights. In its 
footnote quoted, from §15-4-4," . . . and in the absence of such a reservation of 
rights shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in §15-4-5." 
At the time of the settlement with Stengel, Plaintiff had no knowledge, and no reason to 
know, that Stengel was in the course and scope of his employment with Coca Cola. Therefore 
any judgment against Coca Cola should be reduced "only to the extent" of the amounts paid by 
any co-obligor, pursuant to §15-4-5. In Nelson v. Corp., supra, the court explained, . . . (A)ny 
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amount received by one obligor is to be credited against any amount owed by the rest. A release 
by a co-obligor discharges only co-obligors to the extent provided for in §15-4-5. American 
States Insurance, the underinsured carrier of Plaintiff, is not a co-obligor. Pursuant to §15-4-1, 
obligor is defined as a "debtor or person liable for a tort." An underinsured carrier is an entity 
liable under a first party contract claim, and is not a debtor and is not liable in tort. Therefore, 
the trail court was in error in finding that Coca-cola is entitled to a credit in the amount of 
$300,000. 
VIII. UTAH UNINSURED MOTORIST LAW AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
LAW ESTABLISHED, BY STATUTE, A STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER WHICH 
MONETARY BENEFITS CAN BE PAID TO AN INJURED PARTY WHERE THERE 
ARE INSUFFICIENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES OR INSURANCE COVERAGE 
AVAILABLE TO THE TORT FEASOR. 
The Insurance Code in 1985, 1986, 1987, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000 and 2001 have established a statutory scheme under which the operators of motor vehicles 
can protect themselves against the lack of insurance or lack of adequate insurance so prevalent on 
Utah's highways in modern times. Stephen Peterson had purchased such coverage. 
The statutory scheme which has evolved to protect such people as Mr. Peterson appear in 
§ 31A-22-305(l)(8)(9)(10) and (11). 
Those vital sections read as follows: 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household including those 
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live 
elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy 
or owned by the self-insurer; and 
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(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 
to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not 
covered under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by 
Section 31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured 
to the extent of the deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately 
caused by the vehicle operator; 
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is 
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the 
effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability 
insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by the court of competent jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to 
the extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty 
association or fund. 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser motor vehicle policy, unless the 
insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgement 
form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured 
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's 
motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage 
limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less 
than the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under 
Section 31A-22-304. 
(d) The acknowledgement under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that 
issuer of the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests 
different uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
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(e) (i) IN conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same 
medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of 
uninsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage 
in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured 
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle 
liability policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may 
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that 
provides liability coverage under Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage 
until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that 
liability insurer. 
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in 
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor 
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their 
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by purchase 
of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at 
least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an 
injured covered person. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Workers' Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance 
carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' 
Compensation insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the 
covered person has been made whole. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 
63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning asunder Section 41-1 a-
102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
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person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must 
show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing 
evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as 
defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled 
to the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle 
that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle 
the covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off 
against the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall 
be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is 
made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered 
under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a 
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes uninsured 
motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits 
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered 
person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist 
benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" 
as defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor 
vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
covered person, the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's 
resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, 
the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability policy at 
the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability 
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general 
damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
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(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the 
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-301(l)(c) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage into a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgement form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase 
underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are 
less than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two 
or more persons in any one accident. 
(d) The acknowledgement under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that 
issuer of the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests 
different underinsured motorist coverage form the insurer. 
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in 
Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator of 
an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured 
motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage of the owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, combined with, 
or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the underinsured 
motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by 
an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the 
insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured 
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability 
coverage until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage 
from that liability insurer. 
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same 
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medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the 
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that cany 
underinsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor 
vehicle liability p[policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage 
limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a 
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is 
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. 
Except as provided in this Subsection (1), a covered person injured in a vehicle 
described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect 1o 
collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle 
insurance policy under which he is a named insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or 
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any 
one accident. 
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered 
person as defined under Subsection (10)(c)(i)(B). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident 
shall be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Workers' Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance 
carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' 
Compensation insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the 
covered person has been made whole. 
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured 
motorist coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a 
"covered person" as defined under Subsection (1): 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured 
motor vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
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covered person, the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's 
resident relative. J 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of 
coverage. 
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(b)(i)(B) is 
entitled to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any 
one vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family 
member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle 
the covered person is occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off 
against the other. 
(d) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent 
elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle 
underinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last 
liability policy payment. 
Judge Dever obviously misunderstood the nature, purpose and application of the 
underinsured motorist statutory scheme. American States paid Mr. Peterson amounts which 
would otherwise have had to have been paid by the tortfeasor or tortfeasors such as the Coca 
Cola defendants. When American States, by and through its contract, agreed to make payments 
under the underinsured motorist portion of its policy, it also obtained the right to subrogate 
against underinsured tortfeasors. 
In this instance, American States advanced $300,000 to Mr. Peterson which Mr. Peterson 
receives and holds as trustee in the event he is able to recover back against the Coca Cola 
defendants for amounts in excess of the $50,000 amount paid by Nationwide and the inclusive 
total above that of $350,000. In essence, American States stands with an in the shoes of Stephen 
Peterson for the purposes of recovering against the tortfeasor. American States is under law and 
ought to be able to recover such amounts against the Coca Cola defendants as their liability and 
the damages in the case can establish. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
interlocutory Order dated August 28, 2000 that granted Defendant' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and remand the case for trial allowing Plaintiff to try his case against the Defendants 
under a theory of vicarious liability/ respondeat superior. 
/ * DATED this AT day of May, 2001. 
DUNN& 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
PAUL J. SMONSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Paul J. Simonson, #7987 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
230 South 500 East, Suite 460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
_,. n 
I, Paul J. Simonson, certify that on this ; s | >^ 'day of May, 2001,1 served a copy of the 
attached BRIEF OF PETITIONER upon Dale Lambert, the counsel for the Respondent in this 
matter, by personally serving it upon him at the following address: 
DALE LAMBERT 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
50 S. Main St., Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-1 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Obligation" includes a liability in tort and contractual 
obligations; 
(2) "Obligee" includes a creditor and a person having a right 
based on a tort; 
(3) "Obligor" includes a debtor and a person liable for a tort; 
(4) "Several obligors" means obligors severally bound for the 
same performance. 
Utah Code Ann § 15-4-4 
Subject to the provisions of Section 15-4-3, the obligee's release or 
discharge of one or more of several obligors, or of one or more of joint or 
of joint and several obligors, shall not discharge co-obligors against whom 
the obligee in writing and as part of the same transaction as the release or 
discharge expressly reserves his rights; and in the absence of such a 
reservation of rights shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent 
provided in Section 15-4-5. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-5 
If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express 
reservation of rights against co-obligor then knows or has reason to know 
that the obligor released or discharged did not pay as much of the claim as 
he was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the 
obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount 
which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the released or 
discharged obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not then such 
knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor 
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: (a) 
the amount of the fractional share of the obligor released or discharged, or 
(b) the amount that such obligor was bound by his contract or relation with 
the co-obligor to pay. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants 
does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2 
wt AND IN CONSIDERATION OF the payment to me/us of the sum of (%£XJLCJuKJL 
er goofi and valuable consideration. I/we, being of lawful i 
—« Dollars, 
and oth l age, have released and discharged, and by these 
presents do for myself/ourselves, my/our heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, release, acquit and forever 
a ^ -rU/iMAS s Susan <5knaeJ ^ m mtona7Hr_, Muhiwa 
(reserving, however, our rights toMre made whole through our uninsured 
motorist coverage under our auto insurer. American States Ins. Company) 
and any and all other persons, firms and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not, of and from atny and 
all past, present and future actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, 
compensation, third party actions, suits at law or in equity, including claims or suits for contribution and/or indem-
nity, of whatever nature, and all consequential damage on account of, or in any way growing out of any and all known 
and unknown personal injuries, death and/or property damage resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on 
#** ... «&B-3Z «„ — 20MS 4 <**£ 'ALt ttkh or about the. 
I/we hereby declare and represent that the injuries sustained may be permanent and progressive and that recovery 
therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and in making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed that I/we 
rely wholly upon my/our own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and duration of said injuries, and that 
I/we have not been influenced to any extent whatever in making this release by any representations or statements 
regarding said injuries, or regarding any other matters, made by the persons, firms or corporations who are hereby 
released, or by any person or persons representing him or them, or by any physician or surgeon by him or them em-
ployed. 
I/we understand that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment 
is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the persons, firms and corporations hereby released 
by whom liability is expressly denied. QL A I ^ly rf\*J 
It is agreed that distribution of the above sum shall be made as follows: (Jlt£- L+Lt@f\ IllU/LP^ 
This release contains the ENTIRE AGREEMENT between the parties hereto, and the terms of this release are 
contractual and not a mere recital. 
I/we further state that I/we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and I/we 
sign the same as my/our own free act. 
WITNESS. Q W \ . hand and seal this. v\\u .day of 
Name 
/ ^ ~ ) l N THE PRESENCE OF
 M . * 




S te of 
C'junty of ss. 
On this . . day nf C V k O w ^ T , 1 9 ^ 3 . before me personally appeared. <S^X»CWM 
j A ^ 
to me known to be the person^, described 
herein, and who executed the foregoing instrument and 
voluntarily executed the same. 
My term expires. 
acknowledged that ^ A N & X f 
r^ 
/ £ ^ * - ^ - ^ - * — ,<cA*-*~*> 
NOTARY PUBLIC £ C - * ^ 
A . , « , . C. f. 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3 
"T&Z01*7*™ COURT 
™ * Judicial DistruS1 
Dale J. Lambert, 1871 
Rebecca L. Hill, 6246 
CHRISTIANSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50 Scmt-h Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
COCA-COLA USA; COCA-COT.A HSA 
(BOD) BOTTLING OPERATIONS 
DEPARTMENT; COCA-COLA FOUNTAIN 
SWTRE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC., 
a Delaware Corporation, dba 
COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF 
SALT LAKE; SWIRE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, dba, 
COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF 
SALT LAKE, aka SWIRE COCA COLA; 





FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 96-0901005 PI 
Judge L.A, Dever 
Defendants, Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola 
Bottling Cuuipany of Salt Lake, Swire Tacific Holdings, Inc, dba 
Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake aka Swire Coca-Cola, and 
Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake's, motion for partial 
suitimary judgment: cam* on regularly for hearing on August 8, 2000, 
w»£.j. ^z»^o i~.KJO/fcW 
before the Honorable L.A. Dever. Plaintiffs were represented by 
Tim Dalton Dunn and David Goodwill and defendants werp -represented 
by Dale Lambert and Rebecca Hill. The Court heard the arguments 
of counsel and considered the memorandums and material on file, 
and good cause appearing therefor, 
XT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's; motion 
for partial summary judgment is granted. The Court rules as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice; 
2. The release entered into by Stephen L. Peterson, dated 
August 4, 1993, had the effect of releasing Swire Pacific 
Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake, Swire 
Pacific Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lak^ 
aka Swire Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake 
from any and all liability for which Lliey may be vicariously 
liable for the actions or inactions of Thomas Stengel and, 
therefore, Count I (Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior) of 
plaintiff's complaint is h«r«by dismissed with prejudice; 
3. There is no evidentiary or legal basis which requires 
reforming, voiding, or otherwise failing to enforce the release of 
August 4, 1993; 
4. If for some reason, the release does not release the 
vicarious liability of said defendants, then said defendants are 
2 
entitled to a credit of $350,000 (consisting of $50,000 paid to 
plaintiff by Nationwide Insurance Co., thp Inability carrier for 
Thomas Stengel, and $300,000 paid to plaintiff by American States 
insurance Co., ttie uud^rinsured motorist carrier for Stephen 
Peterson) against any judgment based on the defendant's vicarious 
liability for the acts of Thomas Stengel. 
DATED this _ # > day of 2000. 
^/fj 
D i s t r i c t Couirfc-Jtodge 
A p p r o v e ^ ^ tp form: 
im Dalton Dunn 
Dunn & Dunn 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
TOTAL P.04 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 4 
DAVID A. GOODWILL, BAR NO. 1218 
Attorney for Gayle C. Peterson 
2047 E. Rainbow Point Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1719 
Telephone: (801) 272-9820 
FAX: (801)273-1784 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
STEPHEN L. PETERSON, 
a Protected Person 
ACCPETANCE OF 
APPOINTMENT 
Probate No. 973901638 
The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to die office of guardian of the 
above-named protected person and conservator of the estate of the above-named 
protected person and agrees to perform and discharge the trust of said office. 
The undersigned hereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of this Court in any 
proceeding relating to the above-captioned matter that may be instituted by an interested 
person as defined by the Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
DATED: ^ . ^ / ^ fr^uzgyP 
APPROVEI TO FORM: 
DATED: M^JU^f 
DAVID A. GOOD) 
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DAVID A. GOODWILL, BAR NO.DDFIfc y ^JJ^ 
Attorney for Petitioner Gayle C. Peterson 
2047 E. Rainbow Point Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801) 272-9820 
FAX (801) 273-1784 
couNry 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF G+r\ > 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
GUARDIAN OF INCAPACITATED 
PERSON AND FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF CONSERVATOR 
STEPHEN L. PETERSON 
an Incapacitated Person. 
Probate No. 97 39o /£ 3S 
JUDGE: ZT T>GW~r ftfjtoerticjz: 
PETITIONER, GAYLE C. PETERSON, STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE 
COURT THAT: 
1. Petitioner, as his wife, is interested in the welfare of Stephen L. Peterson, who is an 
incapacitated person. 
2. The person to be protected is 63 years of age and is incapacitated by reason of the 
following circumstances which include but are not limited to: 
Closed head injury with cerebral hemorrhage. U. Hosp 2/12/92 Dr. Carr. Left 
supero orbital rim fracture and nasal fracture. Dir. Peter Heinbecker, 5-20-93. Frontal lobe 
and temporal lobe injuries resulting in confusion, and memory and concentration 
problems. Thirty percent (30%) Permanent disability/impairment due to mental and 
behavioral disorders. Dr. Gregory L. Mayer 6/24/93. 
Difficulty comprehending what he reads and sometimes he simply cannot read 
and understand what he used to be able to read and understand, consistent with injury to 
the frontal and left temporal lobes of the brain. Dr. Peter Heinbecker 5/20/93. Permanent 
impairment /disability of 79%, Dr. Peter Heinbecker. 6/9/93. 
3. Venue for this proceeding is proper in this county because the incapacitated person 
resides in this county. 
4. The appointment of petitioner is in the best interest and welfare of the incapacitated 
person and is necessary or desirable as a means of providing continuing care and 
supervision of the person of die incapacitated person. 
5. Appointment of conservator is necessary because the protected person has property 
which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided. 
6. Petitioner requests that the incapacitated person be present with his attorney. 
7. Nothing less than a full guardianship should be granted because nothing less than a full 
guardianship will be adequate. 
8. Petitioner is exempted from the bond requirement under the provisions of Title 7 and 
Section 75-5-411, Utah Code Annotated. 
9. Petitioner resides at 4417 So. 3080 E., Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 and is qualified to 
act as such and has priority because there is no person having a higher or equal priority to 
appointment and petitioner is entitled to consideration for appointment because petitioner 
is the spouse of the protected person. 
10. Notice has been waived by all 4 of the protected person's children. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT: 
1. The Court fix a time and place for hearing. 
2. Notice be given or waived as required by law. 
3. The Court appoint Gayle C. Peterson as conservator of the estate of the protected 
person, Stephen L. Peterson, and full guardian of the person of the incapacitated person, 
Stephen L. Peterson, to act without bond. 




STATE OF UTAH 
^v^Z: 
eterson, Petitioner 
17 So. 3080 E. 
t Lake City, Ut 
£A<&r**-
^r^0\ 
A. Goodwill, ey for Petitioner 
VERIFICATION 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ss 
Petitioner, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing application arc 
true, accurate, and complete to the best of petitioner's knowledge and belief. 
"^fc>^51<£^> 
sppetrdoc/^j^ 
W60 S.Highland Dr. 
Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
£&X£BI 
REi Stephen Peterson 
BATSt May 20, 1993 
ExaMlBKRi Peter Beinbecker, M.D., J.D. 
Qualifications of Examiner 
My curriculum vitae i s attached. Briefly I am a psychiatrist 
in private pract ice and Z am also employed on the Forensic 
Unit of the Utah s ta te Hospital. I have practiced both law 
and medicine and am Board Cert i f i ed in Psychiatry and in 
Forensic Psychiatry. 
Circumstances Leading t o the Present Examination 
In e a r l y May of 1993 I was approached by attorney David 
Goodwill and asked i f I would evaluate Mr. Stephen Peterson 
as to the psychological sequelae of an automobile accident 
which occurred on February 12, 1992. This report iB the 
product of my assessment of Mr. Stephen Peterson and the 
available medical records. 
Documents Reviewed and Persons Interviewed 
In order t o prepare t h i s report I was given a copy of a 
Heuro-Psychological Evaluation done by Gregory L. Mayer, 
Ph.D. which i s dated June 9, 1992. I interviewed Mr. Stephen 
Peterson and h i s wife Gayle on May 15, 1993 at my of f ice for 
about an hour. 
Relevant Past History 
Mr. Stephen Peterson i s a 59-year old married man and the 
father of four children, who currently l ives in Bolladay, 
Utah with his family, on February 12, 1992 he was going 
south on 9th East in Salt Lake City when the car coming 
towards him crossed the center line and hit him head on. Be 
was not wearing a seat belt at the time and his face was cut 
and some facial bones were broken. Be was in a coma for 
approximately an hour and was taken to the University of Utah 
Hospital. Be remained there for a period of about eight 
hours and was released. The evaluation included a CAT scan 
of the head, X-Ray's of his face and head and cardiac 
monitoring which found the presence of an arrhythmia. Mr. 
Peterson has improved some since that time but continues to 
have numbness in his left arm and hand and pain in his left 
shoulder. Be also has difficulty with memory, problems with 
anxiety when driving and an overall general difficulty with 
cognitive activity, which is carefully documented in Dr. 
Mayer's neuro-psychological evaluation. 
Stephen L. Peterson was born in Salina, Utah. Be lived there 
until he was eight years of age at which time the family 
moved to White Pine County, Nevada. Bis mother Ila died at 
age 45 of cancer. Bis father Edwin, died at age 80 of 
Parkinson'8 Disease. Mr. Peterson had three siblings. Bis 
two brothers are dead and his sister who is ten years younger 
is living. One brother died of rheumatic fever and the other 
died of Bodgkin's Disease. Mr. Peterson says that his 
growing up years were unremarkable. Be graduated from White 
Pine County High School in 1953. Be served in the U.S. Marine 
Corps from 1953-1956. Be worked as a clerk and a chauffeur 
and was involved with secret materials in the Marine Corps. 
Be received an honorable discharge in 1956 and attended BYU. 
Be left BYU after several years and went to an art program in 
San Francisco which he did not complete. Be subsequently 
drove city buses for the City of salt Lake for seven years. 
In 1961 he. moved to Kansas City and worked for TWA loading 
cargo. Be then returned to Salt Lake City and drove buses 
again for a period of time. Be again went back to working 
with the airlines and loaded cargo for Frontier Airlines and 
flagged planes. Be then returned to BYU in the Art Program 
and remained there for a year." Subsequently in 1972 he began 
working as a free-lance illustrator and artist. Be was 
married to his present wife, Gayle in June of 1958. They 
have four children, Annette who is 34, Miriam who is 32, 
Steve who is 21 and Dave who is 16 years of age. 
Past medical history includes Spinal Meningitis at age 10 and 
a kidney disease when Mr. Peterson was in college. Be was 
never given a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder-
Byperactivity as a child. Be received average grades in high 
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school and p a r t i c i p a t e d in the band and orches tra . Mr. 
Peterson had surgery on a h ia ta l hernia and an umbilical 
hernia about three years ago. Be received plast ic surgery on 
h i s face and nose after the accident of February, 1992. Be 
also had a deviated septum repaired in May of 1992. Six weeks 
ago he had a hydro-seal operated. Current medications are 
Codura for high blood pressure since November, 1992 which has 
been prescribed by Dr. Civiah. so far as he knows there is 
no history of mental i l l n e s s among his blood r e l a t i v e s and 
Mr. Peterson says he has never been treated for an emotional 
or mental i l l n e s s b e f o r e . B i s hobby has been running 
marathons which he has not been a b l e t o do s i n c e the 
acc ident , and reading. Be has never been convicted of a 
felony or a misdemeanor. He's never had an epi lept ic seizure 
and has only ever been in a coma as a result of the accident 
in February 1992. 
Mental Status Examination 
Upon mental status examination, Mr. Peterson was a Caucasian 
man with gray-black hair . Be had a mustache and a beard and 
good personal hygiene . Bis wife accompanied him i n my 
evaluation. There was nothing unusual about h i s appearance 
or behavior or h i s speech. Be s ta ted he had been qu i t e 
discouraged and depressed in the past year. Be had been aeen 
by f i v e or t e n d o c t o r s , but had never been t r e a t e d for 
depression. Be currently sleeps f i t f u l l y and has nightmares. 
The nightmares he's had have included not being able to get 
out of the Marine Corps because the Marines did not know who 
he was; a l so going up a h i l l in a car in which the h i l l was 
so s teep that the car f e l l backwards; and a l so a recurring 
dream of being l o s t while driving a c i t y bus and wandering 
a i m l e s s l y . These nightmares have a l l occurred s ince the 
accident of- February 1992 and have been l e s s recently. 
B i s energy l e v e l has decreased and h i s a p p e t i t e has 
increased. Be currently weighs 200 pounds and i s 6*1 1/2" 
t a l l . Mr. Peterson says he does not have actual crying 
s p e l l s but frequently "feels l i k e i t . Be does enjoy being 
around people but has frequently wished he were dead s ince 
the accident. Be has never made a suicide attempt. Be has 
had some e p i s o d e s of panic or severe anx ie ty s i n c e the 
accident. He's been very upset about what the accident did 
t o his face. Be has had some attacks of tachycardia where he 
f e e l s h i s heart i s beating irregular ly . Be ge t s short of 
breath w h i l e d r i v i n g . Be does complain of o c c a s i o n a l 
claustrophobia. Be denied obsessive-compulsive symptoms, but 
does state that he i s irr i table and moody and gets frustrated 
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easily, more so than prior to the accident. Be has less 
motivation than he did previously and has difficulty getting 
projects started. Be also has a fear of being awake while 
his wife is asleep and therefore feels he must go to sleep 
before his wife does and wake up after she is up. Be has 
guilt feelings but he denies symptoms of anorexia or bulimia. 
Be denied hallucinations or delusions and did not appear to 
be psychotic. From a somatic standpoint be complains of pain 
in his left shoulder and arm that was not present before the 
accident as well as numbness in his left hand since the 
accident. Be is left handed. 
Stephen Peterson was oriented to time, place and to person. 
Be did complain of some difficulty concentrating and some 
difficulty with short-term memory. Be does have difficulty 
remembering his schedule for any day. He has difficulty 
making change and working. Be just does not have the stamina 
he had previously. He says at times he has difficulty 
comprehending what he reads and sometimes he simply cannot 
read and understand what he used to be able to read and 
understand. Be was able to subtract seven serially from 100 
but made some rather marked mistakes. Be did know the names 
of the last five presidents of the United states. Bis 
interpretation of mildly difficult proverbs was good. He was 
only able to remember two of four objects after five minutes, 
which is below normal but is consistent with his accruement 
in verbal memory which was measured in a number of different 
tests given by Dr. Mayer. 
I asked Mr. Peterson about his daily routine. Be told me 
that he normally gets up at 7t30 in the morning and than goes 
for a run in the park. Be returns home and sculpts or 
paints. Be does some house work. Be watches television and 
goes to bed. Be does participate in the Men's chorus at 
church and they practice weekly. Be and his wife go to about 
four social outings per month. When I asked his wife what 
she had noticed that was most striking about her husband 
since the accident, she stated that he was much more easily 
irritated by his-grandchildren and that he slept fitfully. 
She also noticed his easy frustration tolerance. 
Diagnostic r^pr—i^f* 
Axis X* Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
Organic Mood Disorder With Suicidal 
Thoughts 




Summary and Conclusions 
Stephen L. Peterson i s a 39-year old man who was involved in 
a head on automobile c o l l i s i o n on February 12, 1992 on 9th 
East in Salt Lake City. He suffered a concussion SB well as 
damage to h is face, as well as to his back and neck. He had 
a deep l a c e r a t i o n over h i s l e f t eyebrow and a dev ia ted 
septum. He had a l e f t supero medial orbital rim fracture and 
a nasal f rac ture . He apparently suffered a frontal lobe 
injury which resu l ted i n the psychological symptoms which 
were s een t o i n c l u d e lack of i n t e r e s t and l e t h a r g y , 
d i f f i c u l t y wi th mathematical c a l c u l a t i o n s , d i f f i c u l t y 
remembering the names of people and other short term items 
such as appointments, l eav ing words out i n h i s w r i t i n g , 
d i f f i c u l t y comprehending what he i s reading, d i f f i c u l t y 
fol lowing d i scuss ions , d i f f i c u l t y finding words and los ing 
h i s place when doing different projects . Be has d i f f i c u l t y 
deciphering notes he has written to himself and brief periods 
of q u a s i - a m n e s i a . Mr. Peterson has symptoms of P o s t -
Traumatic- Stress Disorder which include severe depression 
with suic idal ideat ion, becoming a highly nervous and over-
cautious driver, not being able to drive on busy roads, l e s s 
a b i l i t y t o i n t e r a c t s o c i a l l y and f e e l i n g more inadequate 
s ince the accident. Mr. Peterson has had severe nightmares 
and f l a s h b a c k s . He has become preoccupied wi th t h e 
appearance of h i s face s ince the accident and he has had 
d i f f i c u l t y sleeping and easy i r r i t a b i l i t y . His frustration 
tolerance has been s igni f icant ly lowered and he has not been 
able to be comfortable i f his wife i s asleep and he i s awake. 
None 
Hypertension Controlled with 
Medication, Numbness In The Left Arm 
And Hand, Pain In The Left Shoulder 
Closed Head Injury 
#4 Severe (59-year old man who was 
hit head on in a traffic accident a 
year ago causing a period of 
unconsciousness and severe facial 
injury) 
Global Functioning Score: 55/90. 
Best Functioning In The Last Year: 
55/90. 
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In my experience these symptoms are quite common in 
individuals who have been involved in accidents and these 
problems tend to resolve rather slowly and have a tendency to 
have periods of exacerbation* Mr. Peterson appears to have 
improved somewhat since the accident but he continues to have 
rather severe suicidal thoughts which is my greatest concern. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Peter Heinbecker, M.D.f J.D. 
4460 S. Highland Dr. Office (801) 272-0136 
Suite 340 Exchange (801) 573-9347 
Salt Lake City.UT 84124 Fax (801) 272-0160 
Mr. David Goodwill, Esq. June 04,1993 
4191 Shanna Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Dear Mr. Goodwill, 
As you know I evaluated Stephen Peterson on May 20, 1993. He 
described being in a head-on collision which caused him to have a period 
of coma lasting about one hour. Neuropsychological testing which was 
done by Dr. Gregory L. Mayer, Ph.D., indicated that Mr. Peterson had a 
closed end head injury which has resulted in a marked decrement in 
verbal memory as well as other deficits which were found to be 
consistent with injury to the frontal and left temporal lobes of the 
brain. Dr. Mayer found that Mr. Peterson continued to suffer from mild 
frontal lobe dysfunction. 
This was certainly consistent with my findings of an Organic Mood 
Disorder and a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. From my discussion 
with Mr. Peterson and his wife he seemed to be just about half as 
effective in his ability to work as he had been previously. He felt that 
certain abilities, such as sculpting, were easier for him than was 
painting or drawing. 
He does have significant memory problems as well as a significant 
frustration tolerance. The depression that is associated with the 
organic problem probably is the most treatable. I have begun him on an 
anti-depressant and I would hope that there is about a fifty percent 
chance that this will make some significant difference in his mood. He 
also could benefit from individual psychotherapy which would help him 
deal with the problems with mood as well as the problems with his 
cognition, and his reaction to the trauma. 
I would anticipate medication assessments on a monthly basis for 
a period of about three years and individual psychotherapy on a weekly 
basis for a period of about one year. 
Peter Heinbecker, M.D., J.D. 
4460 S. Highland Dr. Office (801) 2724W 
Suite 340 Exchange (801) 573-9347 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 Fax (801) 272-0160 
Mr. David Goodwill June 09,1993 
Attorney At Law 
4191 Shanna Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
RE: Stephen Peterson 
Dear Mr. Goodwill 
This is an addendum to my previous letter regarding the level of 
permanent disability in Kir. Stephen Peterson, whom I evaluated on May 20, 
1993. Based on my report I find him to have a disability percentage of 79%. This 
takes into consideration all aspects of his injury. Please let me know if further 
clarification of my rating is necessary. 
Yours Truly, 
Peter Heinbecker, MD* LD. 
I 
t 
SotJh 500 East. & * • 100 
. Lmk* Qty. u * h 84102-2015 
f f p h o r » (801) 532-1475 
•AX (001) 632-1480 
itmOoMvt^n.Pn.O. 
*»gory L. May* . Ph.0. 
• c h i r t W n g M c w , Pn.0 
vyFoy* M.S., CCC-SL* 
ryK. «• ! • • , M.S..6d,S. 
*#*aMW#r.LCSW 
June 24, 1993 
David A. Goodwill 
Attorney at Law 
4191 Shanna Street 
Holladay, UT 84124 
RE: Stephen Peterson 
DOB: 02/07/34 
Dear Mr. Goodwill: 
This is in response to your request for a disability rating for Mr. Stephen 
Peterson. Mr* Peterson is a 59-year-old gentleman, working as a freelance 
illustrator and artist, who was the unrestrained driver of a vehicle which was 
struck in a head on collision on 02/12/91 Subsequently, Mr. Peterson 
suffered loss of consciousness and amnesia untfl he awoke in the Emergency 
Room at the University of Utah Medical Center. At the Emergency Room, 
a large deep laceration was noted over his eyebrow. Mr. Peterson presented 
with diplopia. Left periorbital swelling above the eye was also noted, as well 
as blood in the nares. Mr. Peterson presented with lacerations on both sides 
of his nose and the septum was questionably deviated A CT scan of the face 
conducted on 02/12/92 indicated a left superomedial orbital rim fracture and 
nasal fracture. Mr* Peterson was diagnosed with closed head injury with loss 
of consciousness, left eyebrow laceration with orbital fracture, multiple facial 
lacerations, and nasal bone fractures. 
Mr. Peterson and his wife were seen for an intake interview on 03/30/92 and 
the initial neuropsychological evaluation was conducted on 05 A3 an d 05/15/92. 
At the time of the evaluation, Mir. Peterson reported difficulty with initiation 
of his illustration and other ait projects. In addition to difficulty with 
mathematic calculating, Mr. Peterson acknowledged having slower, confused 
thinking. He reported difficulty with thought formulation and verbal 
expression. He indicated that he had difficulty keeping up with conversations 
and was experiencing difficulty with concentration and easy distractibility. He 
reported some significant memoiy difficulties also. He reported significant 
difficulties with frustration tolerance, particularly in regard to complex 
activities or activities involving extensive planning and organizing, as well as 
activities which required delay of gratification. He reported significant sleep 
disruption with nightmares. He appeared to be embarrassed by his recent 
onset of difficulties and it appeared that his mood was depressed. Mr. 
Peterson described a number of physical difficulties, including numbness in 
the left frontal region, dull headaches, and a sKghtly changed sense of smelL 
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He also described some blurring in his vision and occasional flashing lights. He noted easy 
fatigability. Mr. Peterson also noted that he had become highly nervous and overly 
cautious as a driver. Finally, Mr. Peterson indicated that he noticed changes in his ability 
to interact socially. Mrs. Peterson was also interviewed and she corroborated many of the 
concerns voiced by her husband 
The results of the neuropsychological evaluation were suggestive of slightly lowered visual-
perceptual functioning. Mild bilateral slowing of motor speed and dexterity was also noted, 
as was inconsistency of attention and concentration. Of perhaps the greatest concern was 
a marked decrement in verbal memory as measured by a number of different tests. 
Mr. Peterson was subsequently seen by Kathleen B. Digre, M.D. for neuroophthahnologic 
examination. Based upon her examination of Mr. Peterson, Dr. Digre concluded that he 
developed the following abnormalities subsequent to the head injury: Slight change in his 
angle, most likely from the trauma, which perhaps lead to minor change of his prescription 
for glasses. He also displayed mild convergence insufficiency, which Dr. Digre noted has 
been reported in many cases after head injury. Mr. Peterson also displayed an incidental 
cataract Mr. Peterson was also seen by Mano Swartz, M.D., who reported a traumatic 
maculopathy. Despite this, no apparent major disability was present from the resulting 
small change in the macula. 
On 05/18/93, Mr. Peterson was seen with his wife, Gayle, for the present follow-up 
consultation. At that time, the Petersons reported continuing difficulties for Mr. Peterson 
related to distractibility and irritability. Continuing difficulty with sleep was noted. Mr. 
Peterson continued to have difficulty with reasoning and mathematk calculations. For 
example, to complete basic daily tasks such as balancing the checkbook or figuring out 
change at a grocery store or at a service station, Mr. Peterson has to use a calculator. He 
continues to find this somewhat embarrassing. Mr. Peterson also continues to have 
difficulty related to forgetting things. Mrs. Peterson noted in particular her husband's 
consistent inability to finish projects. Mr. Peterson's commercial art work was described as 
almost completely ground to a haft. In addition, some difficulty with communication was 
noted related to the hearing loss. Mrs? Peterson also noted that her husband had become 
quite intolerant in his interactions with children, including the grandchildren. Whereas in 
the past he was described as being quite a good babysitter who displayed a great deal of 
empathy for children, more recently it has been observed that he will take a separate car 
rather than be in the same car with them. In particular, he appears to have difficulty coping 
with the "hustle and bustle" of children. Mr. Peterson also described some emotional 
distress related to a growing sense of insecurity related to his fears that his wife could be 
killed in a motor vehicle accident Some tendency to obsess about this to the point of 
sleeplessness, with some attending mild compulsive behaviors, was also noted. At the time 
of the recent interaction with Mr. Peterson, he was on recently prescribed Zoloft, which, 
according to Mr. Peterson, was beginning to improve his mood. 
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Mr. Peterson was seen subsequently for several sessions of individual treatment to address 
the issues of mood, the obsessions regarding the safety of his wife, and to provide some 
compensatory strategies to assist Mr. Peterson to be more productive at home and in his 
wort Mr. Peterson was able to make some reasonable gains in a brief period of time, 
particularly regarding the improvement of his mood and the reduction of the obsessive type 
behavior. He also began to work on the process of acceptance of his current situation and 
the need for some compensatory strategies to work around his difficulties; this appeared to 
reduce the pressure he was putting on himself, particularly in public places when he was 
concerned that others would be aware of his deficits. In addition, Mr. Peterson was 
referred to Maiy Foye, M.S.y speech/language pathologist for further cognitive rehabilitation. 
On 06/23/93, additional neuropsychological testing was conducted to determine more 
completely Mr. Peterson's present status. Based upon this evaluation, it would appear that 
Mr. Peterson continues to display rather significant deficits in verbal memory. This does 
not appear to be caused by his emotional status, as at the time of the evaluation this 
appeared to have improved considerably. In particular, Mr. Peterson displayed significant 
deficits in capacity to retrieve verbal information without additional rehearsal and review. 
In addition, mild visual-perceptual skill deficits were also noted, though Mr. Peterson was 
showing signs of beginning to implement some compensatory strategies. Mfld reduction of 
motor speed and dexterity was also noted to continue. 
Based upon the most recent interviews with Mr. and Mrs. Peterson, several sessions of 
therapy, and recent evaluation results, it appears that a number of the neurocognitive 
difficulties noted in the original neuropsychological evaluation report dated 06/09/92 remain 
and continue to be problematic for Mr. Peterson. Though he has made some gains, the 
pattern of improvement to date (approximately 16 months post accident) does not lend itself 
to a prognosis of robust spontaneous further resolution. This, of course, does not mean to 
say that Mr. Peterson would not be capable of making use of compensatory strategies; 
indeed, he seems to be quite appropriate for cognitive rehabilitation to acquire these. 
Based upon these observations, findings, and considerations, the following disability rating 
is provided based upon the MAM Guides to Permanent Impairment, Third Edition. 
Mental and Behavioral Disorders 
1. Activities of DaDy Living: 10 percent (communication, 
travel/driving). 
1 Social Functioning: 10 percent (hearing, verbal memory, 
confusion, and reduced tolerance of stress). 
3. Concentration, Persistence and Pace: 20 percent 
4. Adapt to Stressful Circumstances: 20 percent 
b**1d A. Goodwill 
June 24,1993 
RE: STEPHEN PETERSON 
P*ge4 
Hie Nervous System 
1. Sensory and Motor Disturbances: 10 percent (peripheral injury, 
hearing loss and visual impairment ratings deferred to 
appropriate physicians). 
2. Language Disturbances: 30 percent (mild acalculia; mSd word 
retrieval; moderate verbal memory). 
3. Disturbances of Complex, Integrated Cerebral Functions: 30 
percent (initiation, organization and planning, memory). 
4. Consciousness Disturbance: 0 to 5 percent 
5. Sleep and Arousal Disorders: 10 percent 
In summary, Mr. Peterson currently presents with a number of disturbances and 
impairments which result in a total disability rating of 30 percent for Mental and Behavioral 
Disorders/Nervous System Function. Note that most areas of dysfunction (disturbances of 
concentration, persistence and pace; disturbances of complex integrated cerebral functions 
and verbal memory; motor disturbance) appear to be related to frontal lobe and temporal 
lobe type difficulties, findings consistent with the specifics of his injury. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me should additional information be required or should 
you wish to discuss this case further. 
Sincerely, 
Gregory L. Mayer, PhJD. 
Psychology/Neuropsychobgy 
GLM.ln 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 5 
DAVID A. GOODWILL, BAR NO. 1218 
2047 E. Rainbow Point Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801) 272-9820 
TIM DALTON DUNN, #0936 
230 South 500 East, Suite 460 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)521-6666 
Attorneys for Stephen L. Peterson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COCA-COLA USA; COCA-COLA USA, 
OPERATIONS; COCA-COLA USA 
(BOD) BOTTLING OPERATIONS 
DEPARTMENT; 
COCA-COLA FOUNTAIN; SWIRE 
PACIFIC HOLDINGS INC. a Delaware 
Corporation, 
dba, COCA-COLA BOTTLING 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE; SWIRE 
PACIFIC HOLDINGS INC. a Delaware 
Corporation, 
dba, COCA-COLA BOTTLING 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE, aka SWIRE 
COCA COLA; COCA-COLA BOTTLING 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. 
GOODWILL IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
DISPOSITIVE MOTION ORAL 
ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No. 96-0901005 PI 
JUDGE: ANTHONY B. QUINN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
Salt Lake County ) 
The undersigned being duly sworn upon his oath, being competent to testify and based on 
his personal knowledge, deposes and says: 
1. In the fall of 1994, when finalizing settlement negotiations with American States, 
the underinsured carrier of Stephen L. Peterson, counsel for Peterson, David A. Goodwill spoke 
with Thomas Stengel. He learned for the first time that on the day of the accident, Stengel was 
employed by Coca-Cola and when he hit the Peterson vehicle head-on he was going from one of 
Coca-Cola's customer's stores to another store in the scope~and course of his employment. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 2000. ( / J 
D'AtflD A. GOOD 
Attorney at Law 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _/ day of June, 2000 
ju 
My Commission Expires: 
NOJCARYPUB0C 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
IJOTAlYHttLit 
DAYLENE STICH 
•Off C ftaMMw Pomt Or. 
•MUkaCity.Uttit 64124 
MyCwwUMmiCipir— 
May 27.2002 
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